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Due to Brexit, the remaining 27 EU Member States would like to remove Eleanor
Sharpston, an Advocate General (AG) nominated by the United Kingdom, from the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, Court). While the fate of AG Eleanor
Sharpston remains unclear, this post argues that the position taken by the EU 27 to
remove her from the Court is well-reasoned and lawful.
Arguments Against the Removal
Several highly distinguished and well-respected scholars, namely Daniel
Halberstam, Dimitry Kochenov, and Laurent Pech have made a case against AG
Sharpston’s removal from the Court before her term expires. Their arguments can be
summarised as follows:
1. Nothing in the Statute of the Court, specifically Articles 5 and 6, provides for an
AG’s departure in case of the respective Member State’s withdrawal.
2. The dismissal of AG Sharpston before the end of her term undermines the
judicial independence of the Court.
3. The respective Member States’ Declaration is of political, not legal force.
Why AG Sharpston Should Nonetheless Leave the
Court
As to the first argument, it is indeed the case that neither the Treaties nor the
Court’s Statute allows for removing an AG before his or her term ends. However,
the same is true for the Judges. Still, the premature dismissal of the British Judge,
Christopher Vajda, has not raised such concerns as those evolving now around
Eleanor Sharpston. Why is that so?
Daniel Halberstam writes that the ‘move [to remove Judge Vajda] was lawful.’ Prof
Halberstam invokes Art. 19(2) of the TEU which provides that ‘[t]he Court of Justice
shall consist of one judge from each Member State.’ However, if one interprets Art.
19(2) with the same degree of meticulousness that was applied by the esteemed
scholars in their reading of Art. 5 of the Court’s Statute, the provision does not
specify the procedure of the Judges’ dismissal but only sets the scheme for the
Court’s composition. Instead, the procedure for removing a Judge is laid out in
Article 6 of the Statute of the CJEU. That provision does not provide any grounds
for removing a Judge before his or her term ends in case of the respective Member
State’s withdrawal. Nonetheless, the removal of Judge Vajda was effectuated and
not criticised by commentators. Moreover, the procedure and conditions of removing
an AG are, under Art. 8 of the Court’s Statute, the same as the ones for removing
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a Judge – which makes it even less comprehensible to apply different standards to
removing an AG in comparison to the removal of a Judge.
If taken as true, the line of reasoning against the premature removal of AG
Sharpston outlined above is capable of leading to some absurd results. Challenging
the link between an AG and the Member State which nominated him or her, Laurent
Pech notes that ‘[t]here is … no legal obligation whatsoever for a Member State to
nominate a national.’ Indeed, there is no such an obligation. However, imagining
a Member State nominating not its citizen but a national of another Member State
is, to say the least, grotesque. More importantly, the same applies to the Judges.
The Treaties do not oblige Member States to nominate their nationals. However,
the legality of the removal of Judge Vajda on the grounds of a link between him and
the departing nation was not challenged by Prof Halberstam, Prof Kochenov, and
Prof Pech. Assuming the premature removal of AG Sharpston goes against the law,
would it not be right to question the removal of Judge Vajda for the same reasons?
Further, the arguments of the esteemed scholars lead to the conclusion that the
independence of AGs is better protected than the independence of the Judges. In
their view, a departing Member State’s Judge cannot remain on the Court’s bench
but its AG, due to the obscurely formulated provisions of the Treaties, shall remain
in office until the term of his or her appointment expires. Then, how are AGs and
Judges different?
The status of the Judges and AGs is mostly the same. There are only two substantial
differences. First, obviously, AGs perform a different function than the Judges and
do not participate in the delivery of the judgements. Second, the number of AGs
does not match the number of Member States. Importantly for the discussion, the
appointment procedure set forth in the Treaties is the same: ‘by common accord of
the governments of the Member States’ (Art. 19(2) TEU, Art. 253 TFEU).
As mentioned above, the conditions for removing a Judge and an AG are the same
and the wording of Art. 19(2) does not provide for the contrary. Therefore, either
the removal of both Judge Vajda and AG Sharpston is illegal or both removals are
lawful. There are no reasons to treat the two cases differently. Moreover, AGs do not
adjudicate; securing their independence more stringently turns the Treaties and the
Court’s Statute upside down.
As to the second argument, indeed the principle of irremovability is located at the
very core of protecting the Court’s independence. Returning to the previous point,
why then did the removal of Judge Vajda not undermine the Court’s independence?
His removal was caused by a decision taken by one Member State in the form of its
exit from the Union. In the case of AG Sharpston, the decision on her removal was
not taken but formalised by a unanimous declaration of the representatives of all the
27 Member States.
While examining the issue of judicial independence, it is instructive to refer to the
Court’s own recent opinion on the matter, namely the case of European Commission
v Republic of Poland (C-619/18). Particularly, the Court notes:
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‘[t]he principle of irremovability requires … that judges may remain in post … until the
expiry of their mandate, where that mandate is for a fixed term. While it is not wholly
absolute, there can be no exceptions to that principle unless they are warranted by
legitimate and compelling grounds, subject to the principle of proportionality. Thus
it is widely accepted that judges may be dismissed if they are deemed unfit for the
purposes of carrying out their duties on account of incapacity or a serious breach of
their obligations, provided the appropriate procedures are followed’ (¶ 76).
This passage supplies some clarifying guidance regarding the issue at hand. First,
the Court talks not about the term but about the mandate. The notion of mandate
entails some authorisation or authoritative command. In other words, the mandate
can be withdrawn when circumstances substantially change. Further, the Court
explicitly states that the principle ‘is not wholly absolute’ and exceptions exist.
Specifically, such an exception is acceptable ‘if it is justified by a legitimate objective,
it is proportionate in the light of that objective and inasmuch as it is not such as
to raise reasonable doubt … as to the imperviousness of the court concerned to
external factors and its neutrality’ (¶ 79).
Assessed through the lens of the Court’s own analysis, the removal of AG Sharpston
does not undermine the Court’s independence. The reason for her removal is the
withdrawal of the Member State that nominated her. Art. 50(3) TEU, as well as
the Withdrawal Agreement, clearly provide for the possibility to exit the Union.
Further, the measure at hand affects only the British members of the Court and
does not entail any disciplinary sanction etc. or change of the Treaties and thus is
proportionate to the objective.
As to the third argument, the Declaration of the EU 27 is indeed of no binding nature.
Nonetheless, there is Art. 50(3) TEU, of more than binding nature, that stipulates
that ‘[t]he Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry
into force of the withdrawal agreement.’ Interpreting Art. 19(2), Laurent Pech comes
to the conclusion that Brexit ‘merely ended the possibility for the UK to nominate a
permanent AG in the future.’ This is certainly true. However, the cause of that is not
Brexit per se; obviously, the UK will not be able to nominate more AGs as the UK is
no longer an EU Member State. As the Treaties cease to apply, Eleanor Sharpston
becomes an AG who was nominated by a country that is no longer an EU Member
State just like Judge Vajda became a Judge proposed by a non-Member State.
The Treaties and the Court’s Statute are ambiguous regarding the fate of an AG
nominated by a Member State which withdraws from the Union. In such a case,
those provisions shall be interpreted with their objective in mind. First, Art. 50 TEU
aims at making a due and orderly departure from the Union possible. Second, the
eighth recital of the Withdrawal Agreement clearly stipulates the end of the mandate
of all members of the intuitions (although there is no definition of members of the
institutions applicable to that recital, it is quite self-evident that an AG is a member
of CJEU), not only appointed or elected by the UK but also those ‘nominated … in
relation to the United Kingdom’s membership of the Union’ (emphasis added). AG
Sharpston was nominated in relation to the UK’s participation in the EU.
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Conclusion
Laurent Pech, in the title of his thought-provoking blog post, aptly describes AG
Sharpston as ‘Schrödinger’s Advocate General.’ However, if AG Sharpston remains,
we will end up with what I call Frankenstein’s Court: AGs appointed by non-Member
States staying in office and the Judges’ independence less protected than the one
of AGs. The reason for AG Sharpston’s removal is not the decision of the Member
States with the aim of intruding into the Court’s independence; it is the consequence
of a Member State’s withdrawal. However unpleasant, we must face it.
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